## CODE <br> SECURITY <br> ASSESSMENT

SHIBNOBI

## Overview

## Project Summary

- Name: Shibnobi
- Version: v2
- Platform: Ethereum, BSC
- Language: Solidity
- Audit Range: Shibnobi_v2.sol


## Project Dashboard

## Application Summary

| Name | Shibnobi |
| :--- | :--- |
| Version | v2 |
| Type | Solidity |
| Dates | Nov 04 2022 |
| Logs | Nov 03 2022, Nov 04 2022 |

## Vulnerability Summary

| Total High-Severity issues | 0 |
| :--- | :--- |
| Total Medium-Severity issues | 0 |
| Total Low-Severity issues | 0 |
| Total informational issues | 5 |
| Total | 5 |

## Contact

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## Risk Level Description

| High Risk | The issue puts a large number of users' sensitive <br> information at risk, or is reasonably likely to lead to <br> catastrophic impact for clients' reputations or serious <br> financial implications for clients and users. |
| :--- | :--- |
| Medium Risk | The issue puts a subset of users' sensitive <br> information at risk, would be detrimental to the client's <br> reputation if exploited, or is reasonably likely to lead <br> to a moderate financial impact. |
| Low Risk | The risk is relatively small and could not be exploited <br> on a recurring basis, or is a risk that the client has <br> indicated is low impact in view of the client's business <br> circumstances. |
| Informational | The issue does not pose an immediate risk, but is <br> relevant to security best practices or defense in <br> depth. |

## Content

Introduction ..... 4
1.1 About SALUS ..... 4
1.2 Audit Breakdown ..... 4
1.3 Disclaimer ..... 4
Findings ..... 5
2.1 Summary of Findings ..... 5
2.2 Notable Findings ..... 6
2.3 Informational Findings ..... 7

1. Questionable token acquisition method ..... 7
2. Uncoordinated variable modification method ..... 8
3. Floating compiler version ..... 9
4. Redundant functions and variables ..... 10
5. Optimization ..... 13

## Introduction

### 1.1 About SALUS

At Salus Security, we are in the business of trust.
We are dedicated to tackling the toughest security challenges facing the industry today. By building foundational trust in technology and infrastructure through security, we help clients to lead their respective industries and unlock their full Web3 potential.

Our team of security experts employ industry-leading proof-of-concept (PoC) methodology for demonstrating smart contract vulnerabilities, coupled with advanced red teaming capabilities and a stereoscopic vulnerability detection service, to deliver comprehensive security assessments that allow clients to stay ahead of the curve.

In addition to smart contract audits and red teaming, our Rapid Detection Service for smart contracts aims to make security accessible to all. This high calibre, yet cost-efficient, security tool has been designed to support a wide range of business needs including investment due diligence, security and code quality assessments, and code optimisation.

We are reachable on Telegram (https://t.me/salusec), Twitter (https://twitter.com/salus_sec), or Email (support@salusec.io).

### 1.2 Audit Breakdown

The objective was to evaluate the repository for security-related issues, code quality, and adherence to specifications and best practices. Possible issues we looked for included (but are not limited to):

- Risky external calls
- Integer overflow/underflow
- Transaction-ordering dependence
- Timestamp dependence
- Access control
- Call stack limits and mishandled exceptions
- Number rounding errors
- Centralization of power
- Logical oversights and denial of service
- Business logic specification
- Code clones, functionality duplication


### 1.3 Disclaimer

Note that this security audit is not designed to replace functional tests required before any software release and does not give any warranties on finding all possible security issues with the given smart contract(s) or blockchain software, i.e., the evaluation result does not guarantee the nonexistence of any further findings of security issues.

## Findings

2.1 Summary of Findings

| ID | Title | Severity | Category | Status |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 1 | Questionable token acquisition method | Informational | Coding Practice | Acknowledged |
| 2 | Uncoordinated variable modification method | Informational | Coding Practice | Resolved |
| 3 | Floating compiler version | Informational | Coding Practice | Acknowledged |
| 4 | Redundant functions and variables | Informational | Coding Practice | Resolved |
| 5 | Optimization | Informational | Coding Practice | Resolved |

### 2.2 Notable Findings

Significant flaws that impact system confidentiality, integrity, or availability are listed below.
No significant issues are found.

### 2.3 Informational Findings

## 1. Questionable token acquisition method

Severity: Informational
Category: Coding Practice
Target:

- Shibnobi_v2.sol


## Description

```
function checkLiquidity() internal {
(uint256 r1, uint256 r2, ) = uniswapV2Pair(uniswapPair).getReserves();
lpTokens = balanceOf(uniswapPair);
hasLiquidity = r1 > 0 && r2 > 0 ? true : false;
}
```

It is questionable of how the "Shibnobi V2" token is acquired from the "uniswapV2Pair". The function "(contractTokenBalance >= IpTokens * minLpBeforeSwapping / 1000)" indicates that the "IpTokens" is derived from "uniswapPair.getReserves._reserve0". However, if other clients transfer "ShibnobiV2 token" to "uniswapPair", it will influence the value of "IpTokens = balanceOf(uniswapPair)".

## Recommendation

Change to:

```
function checkLiquidity() internal {
(uint256 r1, uint256 r2, ) = uniswapV2Pair(uniswapPair).getReserves();
lpTokens = r1;
hasLiquidity = r1 > 0 && r2 > 0 ? true : false;
}
```


## 2. Uncoordinated variable modification method

Severity: Informational Category: Coding Practice

Target:

- Shibnobi_v2.sol


## Description

```
function setBridgeAddress(address a) external onlyOwner {
require(a != address(0), "Can't set 0");
bridgeAddress = a;
}.
function migrateBridge(address newAddress) external onlyOwner {
require(newAddress != address(0) && !automatedMarketMakerPairs[newAddress],
"Can't set this address");
bridgeAddress = newAddress;
isExcludedFromFee[newAddress] = true;
_limits[newAddress].isExcluded = true;
}
```

There are two different functions that can modify the value of "bridgeAddress" but they have been implemented in two different ways.

## Recommendation

Consider removing the "setBridgeAddress(address a)" function and only keep the "migrateBridge(address newAddress)" function.

## 3. Floating compiler version

Severity: Informational
Category: Coding Practice
Target:

- Shibnobi_v2.sol


## Description

```
pragma solidity ^0.8.9
```


## Recommendation

It is recommended to use the up-to-date stable compiler version.

## 4. Redundant functions and variables

## Severity: Informational

```
Target:
    - Shibnobi_v2.sol
```


## Description

```
uint256 private _burnFee;
uint256 private _previousBurnFee;
uint256 private _liquidityFee;
uint256 private _previousLiquidityFee;
uint256 private _marketingFee;
uint256 private _previousMarketingFee;
uint256 private _stakingFee;
uint256 private _previousStakingFee;
function removeAllFee() private {
if (
_burnFee == 0 &&
_liquidityFee == 0 &&
marketingFee == 0 &&
_stakingFee == 0
) return;
_previousBurnFee = _burnFee;
_previousLiquidityFee = _liquidityFee;
_previousMarketingFee = _marketingFee;
_previousStakingFee = _stakingFee;
_burnFee = 0;
_liquidityFee = 0;
_marketingFee = 0;
_stakingFee = 0;
}
function _transfer(
address from,
address to,
uint256 amount
) internal override {
console.log("ShibnobiV2 _transfer call");
if (!tradingActive) {
console.log("tradingActive false");
require(
isExcludedFromFee[from] || isExcludedFromFee[to],
"Trading is not active yet."
);
}
checkLiquidity();
if (hasLiquidity && !inSwapAndLiquify && automatedMarketMakerPairs[to])
{
uint256 contractTokenBalance = balanceOf(address(this));
if (contractTokenBalance >= lpTokens * minLpBeforeSwapping / 1000)
takeFee(contractTokenBalance);
```

```
}
removeAllFee();
if (!isExcludedFromFee[from] && !isExcludedFromFee[to]) {
if (automatedMarketMakerPairs[from]) {
_burnFee = (amount * buyBurnFee) / feeDenominator;
_liquidityFee = (amount * buyLiquidityFee) / feeDenominator;
_marketingFee = (amount * buyMarketingFee) / feeDenominator;
_stakingFee = (amount * buyStakingFee) / feeDenominator;
}
else if (automatedMarketMakerPairs[to]) {
_burnFee = (amount * sellBurnFee) / feeDenominator;
_liquidityFee = (amount * sellLiquidityFee) / feeDenominator;
_marketingFee = (amount * sellMarketingFee) / feeDenominator;
_stakingFee = (amount * sellStakingFee) / feeDenominator;
} else {
_burnFee = (amount * transferBurnFee) / feeDenominator;
_liquidityFee =
(amount * transferLiquidityFee) /
feeDenominator;
_marketingFee =
(amount * transferMarketingFee) /
feeDenominator;
_stakingFee = (amount * transferStakingFee) / feeDenominator;
}
_handleLimited(
from,
to,
amount - _burnFee - _liquidityFee - _marketingFee - _stakingFee
);
}
uint256 _transferAmount = amount -
_burnFee -
_liquidityFee -
_marketingFee -
_stakingFee;
super._transfer(from, to, _transferAmount);
uint256 _feeTotal = _burnFee +
_liquidityFee +
_marketingFee +
_stakingFee;
if (_feeTotal > 0) {
super._transfer(from, address(this), _feeTotal);
_liquidityTokensToSwap += _liquidityFee;
_marketingFeeTokensToSwap += _marketingFee;
_burnFeeTokens += _burnFee;
_stakingFeeTokens += _stakingFee;
}
restoreAllFee();
}
function restoreAllFee() private {
_burnFee = _previousBurnFee;
_liquidityFee = _previousLiquidityFee;
_marketingFee = _previousMarketingFee;
_stakingFee = _previousStakingFee;
}
```


## Recommendation

It is recommended to remove the Variables: "_burnFee, _liquidityFee, _marketingFee, _stakingFee" and functions "function restoreAllFee() private" and "function removeAllFee() private" The parts that are to be removed are labeled in red below. These are also for gas optimization purposes.

## 5. Optimization

```
Severity: Informational Category: Coding Practice
Target:
    - Shibnobi_v2.sol
```


## Description

```
ShibnobiV2.swapTokensForETH._approve(address(this), address(uniswapRouter),
tokenAmount);
ShibnobiV2.addLiquidity._approve(address(this), address(uniswapRouter),
tokenAmount);
```

The approved procedure for "uniswapRouter" has been carried out redundantly twice in both "swapTokensForETH(uint256)" and "addLiquidity(uint256, uint256)" functions.

## Recommendation

It is recommended to remove the below two original functions and add the solution function into the constructor.

```
_approve(address(this), address(uniswapRouter), type(uint256).max);
```

